On Ramsey's Conjecture: Efficient Allocations in the Neoclassical Growth Model with Private Information by Espino, Emilio
IHS Economics Series
Working Paper 154
May 2004
On Ramsey's Conjecture: Efficient 
Allocations in the Neoclassical 
Growth Model with Private 
Information
Emilio Espino
Impressum
Author(s):
Emilio Espino
Title:
On Ramsey's Conjecture: Efficient Allocations in the Neoclassical Growth Model with 
Private Information
ISSN: Unspecified 
2004 Institut für Höhere Studien - Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
Josefstädter Straße 39, A-1080 Wien
E-Mail:  o ce@ihs.ac.atﬃ  
Web: ww   w .ihs.ac.  a  t 
All IHS Working Papers are available online: http://irihs.  ihs.  ac.at/view/ihs_series/   
This paper is available for download without charge at: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/1564/
154 
Reihe Ökonomie 
Economics Series 
 
 
 
 
 
On Ramsey's Conjecture: 
Efficient Allocations in the 
Neoclassical Growth Model 
with Private Information
Emilio Espino 
154
Reihe Ökonomie 
Economics Series 
 
 
 
 
 
On Ramsey's Conjecture: 
Efficient Allocations in the 
Neoclassical Growth Model 
with Private Information
Emilio Espino 
 
May 2004 
 
Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), Wien 
Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna 
 Contact: 
 
Emilio Espino 
Department of Economics and Finance 
Institute for Advanced Studies 
Stumpergasse 56 
1060 Vienna, Austria 
:  +43/1/599 91-156 
fax: +43/1/599 91-163 
e-mail: espino@ihs.ac.at 
 
Founded in 1963 by two prominent Austrians living in exile – the sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld and the 
economist Oskar Morgenstern – with the financial support from the Ford Foundation, the Austrian 
Federal Ministry of Education and the City of Vienna, the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) is the first
institution for postgraduate education and research in economics and the social sciences in Austria.
The Economics Series presents research done at the Department of Economics and Finance and
aims to share “work in progress” in a timely way before formal publication. As usual, authors bear full
responsibility for the content of their contributions.  
 
 
Das Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) wurde im Jahr 1963 von zwei prominenten Exilösterreichern –
dem Soziologen Paul F. Lazarsfeld und dem Ökonomen Oskar Morgenstern – mit Hilfe der Ford-
Stiftung, des Österreichischen Bundesministeriums für Unterricht und der Stadt Wien gegründet und ist 
somit die erste nachuniversitäre Lehr- und Forschungsstätte für die Sozial- und Wirtschafts-
wissenschaften in Österreich. Die Reihe Ökonomie bietet Einblick in die Forschungsarbeit der 
Abteilung für Ökonomie und Finanzwirtschaft und verfolgt das Ziel, abteilungsinterne 
Diskussionsbeiträge einer breiteren fachinternen Öffentlichkeit zugänglich zu machen. Die inhaltliche
Verantwortung für die veröffentlichten Beiträge liegt bei den Autoren und Autorinnen. 
 
Abstract 
In his seminal paper of 1928, Ramsey conjectured that if agents discounted the future 
differently, in the long run all agents except the most patient would live at the subsistence 
level. The validity of this conjecture was investigated in different environments. In particular, 
it has been confirmed in the neoclassical growth model with dynamically complete markets. 
This paper studies this conjecture in a version of this model that includes private information 
and heterogeneous agents. A version of Bayesian Implementation is introduced and a 
recursive formulation of the original allocation problem is established. Efficient allocations 
are renegotiation-proof and the expected utility of any agent cannot go to zero with positive 
probability if the economy does not collapse. If the economy collapses all agents will get zero 
consumption forever. Thus, including any degree of private information in the neoclassical 
growth model will deny Ramsey's conjecture, if efficient allocations are considered. 
 
Keywords 
Dynamic contracts, capital accumulation, private information 
JEL Classification 
C610, D82, D90, D610, D310 
 Comments 
I would like to especially thank to Karl Shell for his encouragement and comments. I also want to thank
for their comments Pablo Beker, Guido Cozzi, Huberto Ennis, David Easley, Hugo Hopenhaynn, 
Alejandro Manelli, Ned Prescott, Jamsheed Shorish, and seminar participants at Cornell, Pittsburgh, Di
Tella, La Plata, and San Andres Universities, the LA and European Econometric Society Meetings, the
SAET meetings, and IHS. All the remaining errors are mine. 
Contents 
1 Introduction 1 
2 The Economy 6 
2.1 The Full Information Case.......................................................................................... 12 
3 Characterization 13 
3.1 Existence of an Efficient Allocation ............................................................................ 15 
3.2 Some Properties of an Efficient Allocation ................................................................. 17 
4 Conclusion 21 
5 Appendix 23 
References  37 
 
 
 
1 Introduction
Will modern societies display extreme levels of wealth concentration in the long-run
if people discount the future diﬀerently? Ramsey [21] conjectured an aﬃrmative
answer to this question.1 These extreme levels of concentration would be the natural
outcome to the rational behavior of agents, as long as the market structure allowed
for enough consumption smoothing through both time and states of nature. Thus, all
consumers except the most patient would live at the subsistence level. The validity of
this conjecture has been investigated in diﬀerent environments. In fact, it turns out
that in the standard stochastic neoclassical growth model with the limit assumption
of dynamically complete markets, this conjecture is impressively accurate. That is,
given an equilibrium interest rate sequence, impatient consumers will trade away their
distant future wealth to consume as much as possible in the relatively near present.2
The literature has also been trying to analyze this conjecture under more realistic
assumptions regarding the market structure. Would this conjecture be valid if some
markets are missing? Important contributions have been made in this dimension as
well. In general, these attempts have arbitrary closed some markets to analyze how
these predictions would change.3 Considering borrowing constraints, Becker [6] shows
that Ramsey’s conjecture holds for the stationary equilibria of one-sector economies.4
Becker and Zilcha [8] study the stochastic version of Becker [6] with similar credit
1“[E]quilibrium would be attained by a division into two classes, the thrifty enjoying bliss and
the improvident at the subsistence level”. Ramsey [21], page 559.
2There are, however, variants of the neoclassical growth model in which the long-run distribution
of wealth can be non-degenerate. Lucas & Stokey [17] show that if preferences are represented by
recursive utility functionals satisfying certain assumptions, there exist stationary equilibria in which
all households have positive wealth in the limit.
3Of course, predictions will change in some other important dimensions. For example, Aiyagari [2]
extends the standard neoclassical growth model to include uninsured idiosyncratic risk and borrowing
constraints in an economy populated by a continuum of ex-ante identical agents. Compared with
the complete markets economy, he shows that agents overaccumulate capital in order to smooth
consumption in the face of idiosyncratic risk. See also Hugget [14] for a related result.
4Becker & Foias [7] found suﬃcient conditions such that the equilibrium converges to the steady
state.
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market imperfections. They show that there exist stochastic stationary equilibria
where Ramsey’s conjecture is not longer valid. See Ghiglino ([12], Section 4) for an
excellent discussion of this literature.
But there is an another important issue involved here. Suppose that some mar-
kets are not present: can extreme levels of wealth concentration be still eﬃcient? In
general, in economies with incomplete markets it is possible to check if the resulting
allocation satisfies some eﬃciency criteria. But after all, why are markets incomplete?
One of the standard arguments to justify diﬀerent incomplete market structures is
the fact that there are informational frictions and therefore some markets will not be
present (see, for example, Arrow [3]). Fundamental contributions were also made re-
garding this issue in a diﬀerent branch of the literature. Consider first an endowment
economy populated with a large number of ex-ante identical agents that are subject to
privately observed idiosyncratic shocks every period. In this environment, Atkeson &
Lucas [5] and Green [13] have shown that (constrained) eﬃcient allocations, indepen-
dently of the feasibility technologies, will display extreme levels of “immiserization”:
the expected utility level of (almost) every agent in the economy converges to the
lower bound with probability one. This result is also present in Thomas & Worral
[25]. Wang [27] shows that these results might not be robust to the assumption of
considering a finite number of ex-ante identical agents.5
There were some extensions to this literature to allow for capital accumulation.
Marcet & Marimon [18] study the stochastic growth model with incentive constraints.
They characterize constrained eﬃcient allocations in an economy with a risk-neutral
principal and a risk-averse agent where investment is unobservable. In this partial
equilibrium framework, they find that information constraints aﬀect consumption
5However, Phelan [19] has shown that Wang’s results depends critically upon the assumptions on
the utility function.
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volatility while the Pareto eﬃcient capital accumulation path can still be decentral-
ized. In an important application of the techniques developed by Abreu, Pearce &
Sttacheti [1]’s seminal contribution, Atkeson [4] examines constrained eﬃcient allo-
cations between a risk-averse borrower and a sequence of risk-neutral lenders in an
economy with both incomplete enforceability and moral hazard. In particular, invest-
ment is unobservable and capital fully depreciates. He shows that capital outflows
could be optimal when a low realization of output is observed. In related work, Khan
& Ravikumar [15],[16] introduce capital accumulation in Green’s model. There is
a continuum of ex-ante identical agents endowed with linear technologies that are
subject to privately observed idiosyncratic productivity shocks. For CRRA utility
functions, they show that the optimal contract exhibits two-sided voluntary partici-
pation and numerical exercises show that both the expected valued and the dispersion
of utility entitlements increase through time.
The interaction between these two branches of the literature has not been exten-
sively studied. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. The existence of private
information provides a basis for market incompleteness. Hence, the main goal of this
paper is to characterize the set of eﬃcient allocations in a particular information-
ally constrained version of the neoclassical growth model with many heterogeneous
agents instead of specifying an arbitrary set of markets. That is, as motivated by
Townsend [26]’s seminal contribution, I analyze Pareto optimal arrangements “to
avoid the imposition of exogenous restrictions and so the nonexecution of some mu-
tually perceived advantageous trade”. I will keep the model as simple as possible.
The economy is populated by N heterogeneous, risk-averse, infinitely-lived agents.
Each period agents are subject to idiosyncratic preference shocks. These shocks are
assumed to be i.i.d. through time and independent across agents. At every date
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t, the history of realizations are private information for each agent. Agents are en-
dowed with one unit of time each period but they do not value leisure. A neoclassical
technology is available at the aggregate level. Since there is private information, it
is well-known since Townsend [26] that the relevant set of (constrained) eﬃcient al-
locations can be history dependent. Hence, standard recursive methods with finite
dimensional state spaces do not apply to characterize optimal allocations. This can
be solved extending the set of state variables to include next period’s “expected dis-
counted utility entitlements” as in the seminal contributions of Abreu et. al. [1],
Spear & Srivastava [23] and Phelan & Townsend [20].
After introducing a version of Bayesian implementation for this particular dy-
namic environment, the existence of an eﬃcient recursive formulation of the original
allocation problem is established. These results might be of interest on their own.
First, the restriction of implementing through Bayesian mechanisms diﬀers from the
rest of the literature described, in particular with Wang [27] and Phelan [19]. They
introduce, at least implicitly, some hybrid between Dominant-Strategies and Bayesian
implementation. There, agents are asked to report truthfully independently of the
others’ reports today (related to Dominant-Strategies implementation), considering
the expected discounted utility attained if all the other agents report truthfully
from tomorrow on (related to Bayesian implementation). The set of incentive com-
patible allocations in this paper contains the set of incentive compatible allocations
considered in those papers. With a continuum of agents, as in Atkeson & Lucas [5],
both concepts collapse since agents are individually very “small” and then their own
report cannot aﬀect the entitlement to the others.
Second, I establish a version of the Principle of Optimality for this environment:
future utilities lie on the frontier of the utility set and therefore ex-ante eﬃcient
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contracts are renegotiation-proof. This implies that there will never be an incentive
to renegotiate the contract since any renegotiation would make at least one agent
worse oﬀ. Here, the planner can use the free disposal technology available as a
commitment device. This does not mean that any agent individually will not have
incentives to renegotiate the contract. However, it is assumed that allocations are
fully enforceable. In dynamic contracting, ex-ante Pareto eﬃcient allocations need
not be ex-post eﬃcient since agents might find that modifications to the original long-
term contract are mutually beneficial as future events unfold. This might happen
because the planner needs to promise low future expected utility levels to the agents
if some states are reported to provide incentives to truthfully report today. But if this
happens and ex-ante eﬃcient contracts are not renegotiation-proof, the assumption
that contracts are costlessly enforceable might be stretched to the limit.
Some other important properties of the eﬃcient allocation are investigated. In
particular, it is shown that it is impossible for the level of expected utility of any agent
to go to zero with positive probability in a non-collapsing economy. On the other
hand, if the economy collapses the stock of capital drops to zero and thus all agents
consume nothing forever. These results provide a remarkably diﬀerent prediction
with respect to a standard result in economies with full information. There, if the
marginal utility of consumption goes to infinity when consumption goes to zero,
impatient agents will end up consuming nothing in the limit. A novel property of the
model presented here is that the introduction of any degree of private information
(that is, even if probabilities diﬀer from 1 by an arbitrary small number) will imply
that this result will no longer hold when considering (constrained) Pareto optimal
trading arrangements.
Finally, since risk-sharing is provided without restricting transfers additionally to
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incentive compatibility and feasibility (in particular, an agent can receive a negative
net transfer from the other agents in the economy), there might be nonexecuted
mutually beneficial trade opportunities in a market economy where all insurance
markets are arbitrarily closed (as, for example, in Hugget [14] and Becker & Zilcha
[8]) .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the origi-
nal resource allocation problem with private information, and some basic properties
are established. Section 3 proves the existence and describes some properties of an
eﬃcient allocation. Section 4 concludes. The Appendix contains all the proofs.
2 The Economy
The economy is populated by a finite number of infinitely-lived heterogeneous agents
with names in the set I = {1, ..., N} (with typical element n). Time t = 0, 1, 2, ... is
discrete. There is only one consumption good. Each agent is endowed with one unit
of time each period. To simplify, let us assume that agents do not value leisure.
Production possibilities are represented by a standard neoclassical production
function. That is, if at date t the stock of capital is Kt and the time used to produce
is Lt, then the total output is given by F (Kt, Lt). I assume that F is increasing in
both arguments and thus, given that agents do not value leisure, Lt = N each period.
Let us denote f(K) = F (K,N).
Assumption 1: f : R+ → R+ is strictly increasing, strictly concave and diﬀeren-
tiable. Moreover, there exists K > 0 such that f(k) ≥ k if and only if k ≤ K.6
Each period agent n receives an idiosyncratic preference shock θn. I assume that
θn takes value in the finite set Θ = {θ1, ..., θJ} where θi > θj if i > j. Preference
6Note that this representation is general and it may include capital depreciation.
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shocks are assumed to be independent across agents and i.i.d. across time for each
agent. That is, let πnt(θj) = πn(θj) > 0 be the probability at date t for agent
n of having a preference shock θj . Since the number of agents is finite, there is
aggregate uncertainty. Let θ = (θ1, ..., θN ) ∈ ΘN denote the aggregate preference
shock with probability π(θ) =
Q
n∈N πn(θn). Let µt+1 be the probability distribution
on the measurable space (2Θ
N(t+1)
,ΘN(t+1)) induced by π. That is, µt+1(θt) is the
probability of the aggregate partial history up to date t, θt = (θ0, ..., θt) ∈ ΘN(t+1).
Let S denote the consumption set, which is defined in the following way:
S = {{Ct}∞t=0 : Ct : ΘN(t+1) → R+ and sup
t,θt
©
Ct(θt)
ª
<∞}
Preferences over S are represented by a time-separable expected discounted utility
function U : S → R+. More precisely, if c ∈ S
U(c) = E{
∞X
t=0
βtnθntun(Ct)}
It is assumed that for all n ∈ I, βn ∈ (0, 1) and un : R+ → R is strictly increasing,
strictly concave and twice diﬀerentiable, where idiosyncratic preference shocks are
multiplicative. Assume also that lim
ct→0
u0n(ct) = +∞ for all n ∈ I. Without loss
of generality, assume un(0) = 0 and
P
θ πn(θ)θ = 1 for all n. E represents the
expectation operator.
Feasible Incentive Compatibility Allocations
Since it is assumed that θnt and θtn are private information, agents will be asked
to report their own preference shocks. I will assume that there is no way to audit or
verify the answer that any agent chooses to give. I also assume that allocations are
fully enforceable.
Given a privately observed partial history θtn up to date t by agent n, he chooses
to report znt(θtn) ∈ Θ at date t. Let zn = {znt(θtn)}∞t=0 represent agent n0s sequence of
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reporting strategies where znt : Θt+1 → Θ for all t. Denote z = (z1, ..., zN) = (zn, z−n)
the sequence of aggregate reporting strategies. Let z∗n be the truthtelling reporting
strategy for agent n where z∗nt(θtn) = θnt for all t and θtn ∈ Θt+1. Note that since
each individual only observes his own preference shock, agent n0s reporting strategy
depends only upon his own partial history.
Let K 0 = {Kt+1}∞t=0 be an investment rule where Kt+1 : ΘN(t+1) → R+ for
all t. Similarly, let C = {Ct}∞t=0 be a consumption transfer where Ct : ΘN(t+1) →
RN+ for all t. To interpret this, consider any aggregate realization θt up to date
t and any aggregate reporting strategy z. Consumption for each agent n is given
by Cnt(zt(θt)) ≥ 0. Similarly, the stock of capital at period t + 1 will be given by
Kt+1(z
t(θt)) ≥ 0. Any pair (C,K 0) satisfying these properties is called an allocation.
Definition 1 Given k, an allocation (C,K 0) is feasible if for all aggregate reporting
strategies z
Kt+1(z
t(θt)) +
X
n∈N
Cnt(z
t(θt)) ≤ f(Kt(zt−1(θt−1))) (1)
for all t, all θt and k0 = k.
The levels of capital will be also restricted to those levels that are sustainable.
Suppose thatKt(θt−1) ≤ K. Since consumption must be nonnegative, from feasibility
and the definition of an allocation we have that for all t and for all reports θt
0 ≤ Kt+1(θt) ≤ f(Kt(θt−1)) ≤ K
Denote X ≡ [0,K] as the set of sustainable capital levels. It will be assumed that
k0 ∈ X and therefore any feasible allocation will necessarily satisfy thatKt+1(θt) ∈ X
for all t and all θt.
Suppose that some arbitrary aggregate partial history θt−1 has been reported. Let
z0 be an aggregate continuation reporting strategy from period t onwards. Given an
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allocation (C,K 0), define the level of expected discounted utility entitled to agent n
at date t for each z0 as follows:
Unt(C,K
0, z0kθt−1) =
∞X
s=0
βsn{
Z
ΘN(s+1)
θnsun(Cnt(θt−1, zs(θs))}µt+s+1(θt−1, θs+1)
=
X
θ∈ΘN
π(θ){θnun(Cnt(θt−1, z0(θ))
+βnUnt+1(C,K 0, z0(θ)kθt−1, z0(θ))}
Here z0(θ) is the continuation reporting strategy from period t+ 1 onwards induced
by z0 when the first element θ is kept constant. When t = 0, we write for any z
Un(C,K
0, z) = Un0(C,K 0, z)
The following definition says that an allocation is incentive compatible if truthtelling
is the best response for each agent whenever he considers that the other agents will
truthfully report their own preference shocks not only today but also in the future.
Definition 2 Given k0 ∈ X, an allocation (C,K 0) is incentive compatible if for all
agents, for all t ≥ 0, all θt−1 and all z0n
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)[θnun(Cnt(θt−1, θn, θ−n)) + βnUnt+1(C,K 0, z∗n, z∗−nkθt−1, θn, θ−n)] (2)
≥
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)[θnun(Cnt(θt−1,eθn, θ−n)) + βnUnt+1(C,K 0, z0n, z∗−nkθt−1,eθn, θ−n)]
for all eθn and θn.
This can be interpreted as the natural extension of Bayesian implementation
for this particular dynamic environment, which diﬀers from the related literature
as mentioned in the Introduction. Note that Definition 2 takes into account that
agents can choose a continuation reporting strategy every period after they have
observed their own preference shock histories. The restriction of analyzing incentive
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compatible allocations is without loss of generality since it can be shown that the
relevant version of the celebrated Revelation Principle holds.7 Roughly speaking, if
there is any way in which some insurance can be provided through any allocation
then there is an equivalent incentive compatible way in which agents report their
true preference shocks.
The economy can be interpreted as both an N agent version of the economy
studied by Atkeson & Lucas [5] with capital accumulation and a private information
version of the model studied in, among many others, Becker [6] and Becker & Zilcha
[8].
The notion of eﬃciency that will be analyzed throughout the paper can now be
defined. Note that in this definition we are already using the fact that the allocation
must be incentive compatible.
Definition 3 An allocation (C∗,K 0∗) is eﬃcient at (k0, {un}Nn=2) if
(C∗,K 0∗) ∈ argmax
(C,K0)
{U1(C,K 0, z∗) : (C,K 0) satisfies (1)-(2) and
Un(C,K
0, z∗) = un for all n = 2, ..., N}
Let Ψ(k) be the utility possibility set for this economy when k ∈ X is the initial
stock of capital. That is,
Ψ(k) ≡ {u ∈ RN : ∃ (C,K 0) satisfying (1)−(2) and un = Un(C,K 0, z∗) ∀ n, k0 = k}
It is important to mention that if an eﬃcient allocation exists, then it will also
be (constrained) Pareto optimal. This follow from the fact that the utility frontier
will in fact be strictly decreasing in this environment.
This correspondence Ψ, mapping X into RN , has some properties that can be
established immediately.
7More precisely, it is well-known that the revelation principle holds for any time horizon and any
stochastic structure.
10
Remark 1 For all k ∈ X, Ψ(k) is nonempty. Consider the allocation
Cn0(θ) =
f(k)
N
and K1(θ) = 0 for all θ, n
Cnt(θt) = 0 and Kt+1(θt) = 0 for all t ≥ 1, n and θt
If we define un =
P
θn∈Θ πn(θn)θnun(
f(k)
N ), then clearly (un)n∈N ∈ Ψ(k).
Remark 2 It is uniformly bounded. That is, for all k ∈ X there exists a bounded
subset of RN , say H, such that Ψ(k) ⊂ H. To see this, note that for all agent n,
0 ≤ cnt ≤ f(kt) ≤ K. Therefore, for any k ∈ X if u ∈ Ψ(k), then 0 ≤ un ≤ un(K)1−βn .
Remark 3 There exists u1 > 0 such that u = (u1, 0, ...0) ∈ Ψ(k) for all k > 0. To
see this, consider the following allocation: given k > 0, define for all for all t ≥ 0 and
all θt
C10(θ) = f(k)
Cnt(θt) = 0 for all n ≥ 2
Kt+1(θt) = 0 for t
Note that (C,K 0) is an incentive compatible, feasible allocation given the definitions
of an allocation, reporting strategies and feasibility. Note also that Un(C,K 0) = 0 for
all n ≥ 2 and U1(C,K 0) > 0 given that f(k) > 0 for all k > 0.
The following Lemma will be useful to establish some results “in the limit”. This
result allows the restriction to one-period deviation when one considers incentive
compatible allocations.8
Lemma 1 Let (C,K 0) be any feasible allocation at k ∈ X. Consider any agent n ∈ I
and let z0n, z0mn be continuation reporting strategies where zmns = zns for all s ≤ m and
8See, for example, Atkeson & Lucas [5] for a related result.
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zmns = z
∗
ns thereafter. Then, for all t ≥ 0 and any aggregate report θt−1
lim sup
m→∞
[Unt(C,K
0, z0mn , z
∗
−nkθt−1)] = Unt(C,K 0, z0n, z∗−nkθt−1)
2.1 The Full Information Case
I will briefly discuss Ramsey’s conjecture in the model described above with full
information. That is, I will consider the allocation problem just described without
the incentive compatibility constraints. Since it is easy to establish that both the
First and Second Welfare Theorems hold, the property described below will also hold
in a economy with dynamically complete markets.
Consider the following problem that the planner has to solve:
max
(B,K0)
∞X
t=0
βt1{
Z
ΘN(t+1)
θ1tu1(C1t(θt))µt+1(θt)}
subject to (1) and for all n
∞X
t=0
βtn{
Z
ΘN(t+1)
θntun(Cnt(θt))µt+1(θt)} = un
Note that nonnegativity of consumption is implicit in the definition of an allocation.
Suppose that β1 > βn for all n 6= 1. Necessary first order conditions for the unique
interior solution will imply that for all n ∈ I, for all t and for all θt
αnβtnθntu0n(Cnt(θt))µt+1(θt) = λt(θt)
Here, αn > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to agent n (with α1 = 1) and
λt(θt) > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the feasibility constraint at
period t if θt is the aggregate partial history. Thus, for all t and for all θt
βt1u01(C1t(θt))
αnβtnu0n(Cnt(θt))
= 1 (3)
Since (β1/βn)t → +∞ as t goes to infinity, it follows from (3) that
lim
t→∞
£
u01(C1t(θt))/u0n(Cnt(θt)
¤
) = 0
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Given that consumption is uniformly bounded from above, it is clear then that
cnt(θt)→ 0 for all {θt}∞t=0. Therefore, only the patient agent consumes in the limit.
Impatient agents would want to trade future wealth for present consumption and
therefore these individuals would have zero consumption asymptotically. These
extreme levels of concentration were initially conjectured by Ramsey [21]. The va-
lidity of this conjecture for diﬀerent environments was discussed in the Introduction.
In what follows, one of the main results is that with the introduction of any degree
of private information this result no longer holds.
3 Characterization
In this section I will first characterize the utility possibility correspondence defined
by Ψ. After that, I will study some important properties of an eﬃcient allocation.
Let W : X → RN be a nonempty, uniformly bounded correspondence. Let (c, k0)
be a vector-valued function where c : ΘN → RN+ and k0 : ΘN → X. Given any two
functions (c, k0), we say that the function w : ΘN → RN is a continuation value
function with respect to W if w(θ) ∈ W (k0(θ)) for all θ ∈ ΘN . Call (c, k0, w) a
recursive allocation.
Definition 4 Given a correspondence W as before, a recursive allocation (c, k0, w)
is admissible with respect to W at k ∈ X if
(1) w is a continuation value function with respect to W ;
(2) (c, k0, w) satisfies
(2.a) For all θ ∈ ΘN , k0(θ) +
P
n cn(θ) ≤ f(k)
(2.b) Temporary Incentive Compatibility (t.i.c.):
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For all n ∈ I and for all θn,eθn ∈ ΘX
θ−n
π(θ−n) {θnun(cn(θn, θ−n)) + βnwn(θn, θ−n)}
≥
X
θ−n
π(θ−n){θnun(cn(eθn, θ−n)) + βnwn(eθn, θ−n)}
Let (c, k0, w) be admissible with respect to W at k ∈ X and define for all n ∈ I
en(c, k
0, w) =
X
θ∈ΘN
π(θ){θnun(cn(θ)) + βnwn(θ)}
Given k ∈ X, define the following operator:
Φ(W )(k) ≡ {(en)n∈N ∈ RN : ∃ (b, k0, w) admissible w.r.t. W at k, en(b, k0, w) = en}
This operator maps the set of uniformly bounded correspondences into themselves.
The following definition extends to correspondences some definitions given by Abreu
et. al. [1] for sets.9
Definition 5 A correspondence W : X → RN is self-generating if it is nonempty
and W (k) ⊂ Φ(W )(k) for all k ∈ X.
Proposition 2 Let W be a uniformly bounded and self-generating correspondence.
Then, for all k ∈ X
Φ(W )(k) ⊂ Ψ(k)
The intuition for this result can be interpreted as follows. If a correspondence W
is self-generating, any value in W (k) is also in its image Φ(W )(k). This allows one
to choose any vector of utility levels of Φ(W )(k) and transform it period-by period
recursively into a feasible incentive compatible allocation having the same utility
levels.
The next result establishes that Ψ is self-generating itself and therefore is a fixed
point of the operator Φ.
9A related extension was made by Atkeson [4].
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Proposition 3 For all k ∈ X, Ψ(k) = Φ(Ψ)(k).
Thus, any utility level that can be attained with an allocation (C,K 0) can also
be attained by delivering to each agent consumption for today, assigning capital for
tomorrow and promising to each agent some contingent levels of expected utility from
tomorrow on.
This characterization of the utility possibility correspondence turns out to be
extremely important both to establish the existence of an eﬃcient allocation and to
investigate some of its properties. Below, I will discuss suﬃcient conditions such that
a version of the Principle of the Optimality holds and thus the original problem can
be restated as one genuinely recursive.
3.1 Existence of an Eﬃcient Allocation
I will proceed to show that for every k ∈ X, there exists an eﬃcient allocation as
defined before. To do that, a few properties of the operator Φ need to be shown.
Define the graph of a correspondence W : X → RN by the following set:
graph(W ) = {(w, k) ∈ RN ×X : w ∈W (k)}
The next Lemma shows that the operator Φ preserves compactness.
Lemma 4 If graph(W ) is compact, then graph(Φ(W )) is also compact.
Observe that if graph(W1) ⊂ graph(W2), then graph(Φ(W1)) ⊂ graph(Φ(W2)).
This follows directly from the definition of the operator Φ. The last result we need
to show the existence of an eﬃcient allocation is the following.
Lemma 5 Ψ has a compact graph.
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Given that Ψ has a compact graph, it follows that for all k ∈ X, Ψ(k) is a compact
subset of RN . We need to introduce some notation. Let Ψ−1(k) ≡ {u−1 = (un)Nn=2 ∈
RN−1 : ∃ u1 where (u1, u−1) ∈ Ψ(k)}.
For any k ∈ X and given u−1 ∈ Ψ−1(k), define Ψ1(k, u−1) ≡ {u1 ∈ R : (u1, u−1) ∈
Ψ(k)}. It is clear that for all k ∈ X and given u−1 ∈ Ψ−1(k), Ψ1(k, u−1) is a compact
subset of R. Given k and u−1, define the following function:
V (k, u−1) = max{u1 ∈ Ψ1(k, u−1)}
Therefore, it follows that for all k ∈ X and given u−1 ∈ Ψ−1(k), there exists (C∗,K 0∗)
such that
V (k, u−1) = U1(C
∗,K 0∗, z∗) and u−1 = U−1(C∗,K 0∗, z∗)
which is, by definition, an eﬃcient allocation at (k, u−1). It also follows by Proposition
3 that there exists an equivalent eﬃcient recursive allocation (c∗, k0∗, w∗) (which
is admissible with respect to Ψ at k) such that
V (k, u−1) = e1(c
∗, k0∗, w∗) and u−1 = e−1(c∗, k0∗, w∗) (4)
It will be said that a recursive allocation (c, k
0
, w) is promise keeping at u−1 if
un = en(c, k
0, w) for all n ∈ {2, ..., N}.
The next property of the correspondence Ψ will be crucial to show the continuity
of V.
Lemma 6 Ψ has a convex graph.
Hence, since Ψ is a compact-valued correspondence (Lemma 5) with a convex
graph (Lemma 6), it follows that Ψ is continuous and compact-valued.10
10See Stokey, Lucas & Prescott [24], Theorem 3.4 & 3.5.
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3.2 Some Properties of an Eﬃcient Allocation
Some important properties of an eﬃcient allocation (or its equivalent recursive rep-
resentation) can now be investigated. Lemma 7 below shows that eﬃcient trading
arrangements will imply multiperiod relationships as in Townsend [26]. The nature
of these multiperiod relationships comes from the incentive compatibility constraints
to circumvent information diﬃculties. Eﬃcient allocations are thus history depen-
dent: each agent’s report today aﬀects not only his present consumption but also his
consumption from tomorrow on. Given that shocks are i.i.d., this would not be the
case with full information.
Lemma 7 Let (c, k
0
, w) be admissible with respect to Ψ at (k, u−1). For all n ∈ I, if
θn > eθn, then for all n ∈ I
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)un(cn(θn, θ−n)) ≥
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)un(cn(eθn, θ−n))X
θ−n
π(θ−n)wn(θn, θ−n) ≤
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)wn(eθn, θ−n)
The first of these inequalities has an implication that additionally distinguishes
this environment from the rest of the literature. Either with a continuum of agents
or with a finite number of agents with the implementation device as in Wang [27] and
Phelan [19], consumption is increasing in the preference shock. That is, the more the
agent values consumption today, the higher the transfer today, independently of
the others’ reports. Here, an agent will receive a random vector of consumption
depending upon others’ reports, which is increasing with respect to his preference
shock in the sense of second order stochastic dominance. More precisely, the induced
distribution of cn(θj , ·) second order stochastically dominates the induced distribution
of cn(θi, ·) whenever j > i. Therefore, the conditional expectation of the momentary
utility will be increasing in the reported preference shock. On the other hand, agents
17
reporting relatively lower preference shocks are rewarded with a relatively higher level
of conditional expected utility from tomorrow on.
A further characterization of V is essential to show the next results. In particular,
the potential nonconvexity imposed by the incentive compatibility constraints might
make it diﬃcult to apply standard arguments to show the continuity of V . In this
sense, the fact that the preference shocks are multiplicative will play an important
role in simplifying the analysis. The main properties are summarized in the following
Lemma.
Lemma 8 (i) V is strictly increasing in k and strictly decreasing in u−1. (ii) V is
a continuous function.
The next result shows that some of the conditions in Lemma 7 will hold with strict
inequality. Thus, Proposition 9 basically establishes that an allocation providing no
insurance for some agent cannot be eﬃcient.
Proposition 9 Given any k ∈ X and u−1 ∈ Ψ−1(k), consider an arbitrary recursive
allocation (c, k
0
, w) admissible with respect to Ψ at k and promise keeping at u−1.
Consider any agent such that un > 0 and suppose that for all θn ∈ Θ
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)u(cn(θn, θ−n)) = unX
θ−n
π(θ−n)wn(θn, θ−n) = wn
Then, (c, k
0
, w) cannot be eﬃcient at (k, u−1).
The intuition of this result can be grasped as follows. Suppose that an agent’s
report does not aﬀect his conditional expected utility from tomorrow on. The in-
centive compatibility constraints will imply that the conditional expectation of the
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momentary utility will also be constant. This can be dominated by an allocation
providing more consumption (in the sense discussed above) to agents with relatively
high preference shocks and thus providing them some insurance.11
The next result shows that the ex-ante eﬃcient allocation is in fact renegotiation-
proof. This is very important because otherwise ex-post mutually beneficial rene-
gotiations must be assumed away.
Proposition 10 Given any (k, u−1), if (c∗, k
0∗, w∗)(k, u−1) is an eﬃcient recursive
allocation, then it can be constructed such that w∗1(θ) = V (k
0∗(θ), w∗−1(θ)) for all θ.
This result means that the ex-ante eﬃcient allocation will be ex-post eﬃcient.12
That is, the continuation utility levels delivered by any eﬃcient allocation will be on
the utility possibility frontier. Hence, it will never be mutually agreed to rene-
gotiate transfers implied by an eﬃcient allocation. This does not mean that any
agent individually will not have incentives to renegotiate the contract. However,
it has been assumed that allocations are enforceable at the individual level. It is
important to note that to get this result it is crucial that the planner can use the
free disposal technology available as a commitment device. Here, the ability of the
planner to manipulate the stock of capital is crucial to make “credible” that there
will not be ex-post incentives to renegotiate the continuation of the original contract.
In the Conclusion there is an additional discussion about the possibility of collapsing
economies.
From now on, we say that the economy collapses if there exists some (k, u−1)
such that k0∗(θ)(k, u−1) = 0 for some θ. Note that when the economy collapses, no
11Of course, if un = 0 then un = wn = 0 is part of any solution.
12See Fudenberg, Holmstrom & Milgrom [11] and Wang [28] for related results. Also, a similar
result is present in Wang [27] (Proposition 2, pg.582) but the proof presented there seems to be
at least incomplete. More specifically, when showing this result, it does not consider the fact that
the operator is not monotone and then his condition (9) is not necessarily satisfied by the recursive
allocation being considered in the last part of the proof.
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agent will consume from next period on. Very importantly, this is independent of
any their particular characteristics, including their discount factors. But, in which
situation might the economy collapse? While trying to provide incentives to report
preference shocks truthfully, the planner might choose to “penalize” an aggregate
report (θ, ..., θ) by transferring higher levels of consumption today at the expense
of low levels of consumption from tomorrow on. The extreme case would be zero
consumption forever for all agents.
Now, I will show that in an economy not collapsing in the limit, no agent’s ex-
pected utility can converge to any number with positive probability. In particular, it
cannot converge to the lower bound as initially conjectured by Ramsey [21].
Let {Unt}∞t=0 be the stochastic process representing agent n0s expected utility
entitlement given an eﬃcient allocation. Call Ω = {{θt}∞t=0 : θt ∈ ΘN for all t} and
let B(Ω) be the Borel σ − field of Ω. Let µ be the unique probability measure on
(Ω, B(Ω)) generated by the finite-dimensional distributions (µt) (as an application of
the Kolmogorov’s Extension Theorem).
Proposition 11 µ{{θt}∞t=0 : limt→∞Kt+1(θ
t) = k > 0 and lim
t→∞
Unt(θt) = Un ∈ Ψn(k)
for some n} = 0.
Having this result, we can then conclude that the introduction of any degree
of private information precludes the result described in Section 2.1. for economies
with full information. There, the most patient agent consumed all the output in the
limit. Why is this not the case if we consider any degree of private information?
We have already discussed the implication of a collapsing economy. There, no agent
consumes at all. If the economy does not collapse, the idea behind Proposition 11
is, roughly speaking, the following. Suppose that the expected utility level of some
agent converges with positive probability when some eﬃcient allocation is considered.
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This will imply that there will be situations where allocations displaying no long-term
relationships among all agents are eﬃcient. But no allocation like that can be eﬃcient
(Proposition 9), even though agents are heterogeneous and can diﬀer in their discount
factor. The incentive compatibility constraints imply that, for paths with positive
probability, any eﬃcient allocation will need to spread out future expected utility
according to their reports. If the expected utility level converges (as in Section 2.1),
at some point it will be impossible to do that.
4 Conclusion
This paper has studied some properties of eﬃcient allocations in a version of the
stochastic neoclassical growth model with many heterogeneous agents and private
information. The first step was to prove that the original allocation problem had
a recursive formulation in the spirit of Abreu et. al [1] and Spear & Srivastava
[23]. This work has also introduced a simple version of Bayesian implementation for
this particular dynamic environment and has established that the ex-ante eﬃcient
allocations are ex-post eﬃcient where future utility entitlements lie in the utility
possibility frontier. Therefore, long-term eﬃcient contracts are renegotiation-proof
in this environment. To get this result it is important that the planner can manipulate
the stock of capital for next period to make these allocations sequentially eﬃcient.
Then, two main properties of an eﬃcient allocation are additionally discussed.
First, any eﬃcient allocation should provide some insurance to the agents against
idiosyncratic preference shocks. Unlike most of the literature considering an arbitrary
set of incomplete markets, agents can make transfers contingent upon their own
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The type of analysis developed in this paper avoids
the presence of some ex-ante mutually beneficial nonexecuted trade opportunities.
Secondly, I have shown that the level of expected discounted utility cannot con-
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verge with positive probability to the lower bound in a non-collapsing economy. In a
collapsing economy, the stock of capital drops to zero and all agents consume nothing.
These results show that a standard property of eﬃcient allocations in economies with
full information, initially conjectured by Ramsey [21], does not longer hold when any
degree of private information is considered. In those economies, and under standard
assumptions, the impatient agents will end up consuming nothing in the limit and
therefore the level of expected utility converges to the lower bound. The introduction
of any degree of private information and the imposition of incentive compatibility
constraints imply that, for paths with positive probability, any eﬃcient allocation will
need to spread out future expected utility according to the reports. If the expected
utility level converges, this property cannot be satisfied. On the other hand, if the
economy collapses all agents consume zero independently of their degree of patience.
Some potential extensions might be mentioned. In the first place, a natural
theoretical extension would be to try to characterize in more detail both the dynamic
and the limiting properties of this economy. At the level of generality presented in
this paper, this might not be a standard task. However, an important issue must be
mentioned. Nothing in this paper has ruled out the case where the economy collapses
with probability one. In this case, the results of the paper are still important to answer
the main question regarding Ramsey’s conjecture, but are not very relevant in most of
the other dimensions. Work in progress, however, shows that under certain standard
assumptions, collapsing economies are rare events with zero probability.13
Secondly, an algorithm to compute eﬃcient allocations in this environment might
be developed.14 Numerical results could allow computing, for example, welfare losses
13A priori, one cannot consider this possibility completely unlikely. For example, for a dynamic
agency problem with capital accumulation, Di Giannatale [10] numerically shows that the principal’s
stock of capital monotonically decreases over time. I would like to thank an anonymous associate
editor for alerting me to this issue. Details are available upon request.
14Sleet & Yeltekin [22] is an important step to properly tackle this problem.
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imposed by the information structure when compared with eﬃcient allocations in
economies with full information. Moreover, one could also compare the basic welfare
properties of the economy described here with those emerging in economies where
diﬀerent arbitrary market structures are imposed. In general, one of the most relevant
unanswered questions can then be summarized as follows: does private information
really matter? 15 These issues are left for future research.
5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider any m ≥ 0. Note that since for all t ≥ 0 and any
aggregate report θt−1
¯¯
Unt(C,K
0, z0mn , z
∗
−nkθt−1)− Unt(C,K 0, z0n, z∗−nkθt−1)
¯¯
= βn |
X
θ∈ΘN
π(θ){Unt+1(C,K 0, z0m−1n (θn), z∗−nkθt−1, zn0(θn), θ−n)
−Unt+1(C,K 0, z0n(θn), z∗−nkθt−1, zn0(θn), θ−n)} |
≤ βn sup
(θn,θ−n)∈ΘN
| Unt+1(C,K 0, z0m−1n (θn), z∗−nkθt−1, zn0(θn), θ−n)
−Unt+1(C,K 0, z0n(θn), z∗−nkθt−1, zn0(θn), θ−n)
Using this inequality we can get that
¯¯
Unt(C,K
0, z0mn , z
∗
−nkθt−1)− Unt(C,K 0, z0n, z∗−nkθt−1)
¯¯
≤ βm+1n sup
(θmn ,θm−n)∈ΘN×m
| Un,t+m+1(C,K 0, z∗n, z∗−nkθt−1, znm(θmn ), θm−n)
−Un,t+m+1(C,K 0, z0n(θmn ), z∗−nkθt−1, znm(θkn), θk−n) |
15Some contributions have been made in this direction. In particular, Khan & Ravikumar [16]
show that the welfare costs and the growth eﬀects of private information are typically small for their
AK version of Green [13]’s model. See also Cole & Kocherlakota [9].
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Since consumption must be uniformly bounded, the desired result is obtained taking
lim sup
m→∞
in the previous expression (βn ∈ (0, 1) ∀ n).
Proof of Proposition 2. Let w0 ∈ Φ(W,k) for some given k ∈ X. We need
to show that there exists a feasible and incentive compatible allocation (C,K 0) such
that for n ∈ I
Un(C,K
0, z∗) = wn0
Step 1. Since w0 ∈ Φ(W,k), there exists (c, k0, w)(w0) admissible with respect
to W at k such that en(b, k0, w)(w0) = w0. Then, it follows that for all θ ∈ ΘN
w(θ)(w0) ∈ W (k0(θ)) ⊂ Φ(W,k0(θ)) since W is assumed to be self-generating. It is
then clear that we can recursively define, for all t ≥ 0, for all θt and given w0,
kt+1(θt) = k0(θt)(Wt(θt−1))
Ct(θt) = c(θt)(Wt(θt−1))
Wt+1(θt) = w(θt)(Wt(θt−1))
Note that in the construction of this candidate allocation (C,K 0), we are only consid-
ering truthtelling continuation reporting strategies. We claim now that for all n ∈ I,
for all t ≥ 0 and for all θt−1
Wnt(θt−1) = Unt(C,K 0, z∗kθt−1) (5)
To see this, note that it follows from definition that
¯¯
Unt(C,K
0, z∗kθt−1)−Wt(θt−1)
¯¯
= βn
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ X
θ∈ΘN
π(θ){Unt+1(C,K 0, z∗kθt−1, θ)−Wt+1(θt−1, θ)}
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
≤ βnsup
θ
¯¯
Unt+1(C,K
0, z∗kθt−1, θ)−Wt+1(θt−1, θ)
¯¯
≤ βsnsup
θs
¯¯
Unt+s(C,K
0, z∗kθt−1, θs)−Wt+s(θt−1, θs)
¯¯
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Since W is a uniformly bounded correspondence and {Ct}∞t=0 is uniformly bounded
by construction, taking the limsup as s→∞ we get (5) as desired since βn ∈ (0, 1)
for all n ∈ I.
Step 2. We need to show that (C,K 0) is a feasible and incentive compatible
allocation.
(a) Feasibility follows because (c(θt), k0(θt), w(θt))(Wt(θt−1)) are admissible with
respect to W at Kt(θt−1) ∈ X for all t and all θt−1.
(b) Incentive compatibility of our candidate allocation will be proved as usual.
First, we will prove that it holds for strategies that have a finite number of deviation
from truthtelling. Then it will follow then from Lemma 1 that it cannot be violated
by any reporting strategy with infinitely many deviation from truthtelling.
It follows from admissibility, equality (5) and by construction of (C,K 0) that
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)
©
θnun(Cnt(θt−1, θn, θ−n)) + βnUnt+1(C,K 0, z∗n, z∗−nkθt−1, θn, θ−n)
ª
(6)
≥
X
θ−n
π(θ−n){θnun(Cnt(θt−1,eθn, θ−n)) + βnUnt+1(C,K 0, z∗n, z∗−nkθt−1,eθn, θ−n)}
for all n ∈ I, t ≥ 0, θt−1, θn and eθn.
Since it has to hold for all z0n, define zmn as in Lemma 1. We want to show that
for all m ≥ 0
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)
©
θnun(Cnt(θt−1, θn, θ−n)) + βnUnt+1(C,K 0, z∗n, z∗−nkθt−1, θn, θ−n)
ª
(7)
≥
X
θ−n
π(θ−n){θnun(Cnt(θt−1,eθn, θ−n)) + βnUnt+1(C,K 0, zmn , z∗−nkθt−1,eθn, θ−n)}
for all n ∈ I, t ≥ 0, θt−1, θn and eθn. Note that (7) holds for m = 0 since (6) holds.
Suppose that (7) holds for some m. Note that for all θt
Unt+1(C,K
0, zm+1n , z
∗
−nkθt) =
X
θ∈ΘN
π(θ){θnun(Cnt+1(θt, zm+1n0 (θn), θ−n))
+βnUnt+2(C,K 0, zmn (θ), z∗−nkθt, zm+1n0 (θn), θ−n)}
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=
X
θn
π(θn)[
X
θ−n
π(θ−n){θnun(Cnt+1(θt, zm+1n0 (θn), θ−n)
+βnUnt+2(C,K 0, zmn (θ), z∗−nkθt, zm+1n0 (θn), θ−n)}]
≤
X
θn
π(θn)[
X
θ−n
π(θ−n){θnun(Cnt+1(θt, θn, θ−n))
+βnUnt+2(C,K 0, z∗kθt, θn, θ−n)}]
= Unt+1(C,K
0, z∗n, z
∗
−nkθt)
where the first inequality follows because (7) is supposed to hold for m. Hence, given
this inequality and (6) we get
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)
n
θnun(Cnt(θt−1,eθn, θ−n) + βnUnt+1(C,K 0, zm+1n , z∗−nkθt−1,eθn, θ−n)o
≤
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)
n
θnun(Cnt(θt−1,eθn, θ−n) + βnUnt+1(C,K 0, z∗kθt−1,eθn, θ−n)o
≤
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)
©
θnun(Cnt(θt−1, θn, θ−n) + βnUnt+1(B,K 0, z∗kθt−1, θn, θ−n)
ª
It follows by induction that (7) holds for all m ≥ 0. Finally, consider any arbitrary
reporting strategy z0n (included those with infinitely many misreport). If (2) does not
hold, then it follows by Lemma 1 that it should not hold for some large m. But that
is a contradiction to (7).
Proof of Proposition 3. Given some arbitrary k ∈ X, let u ∈ Ψ(k). Then
there exists a feasible and incentive compatible allocation (C,K 0) such that un =
Un(C,K
0, z∗) for all n ∈ I. Put for all n ∈ I and all θ ∈ ΘN
cn(θ) = Cn0(θ), k0n(θ) = Kn1(θ) and wn(θ) = Un1(C,K 0, z∗kθ)
Note that by construction, u = en(c, k0, w).We need to check that (c, k0, w) is admis-
sible with respect to Ψ at k. To do so, we will first check that w(θ) ∈ Ψ(k0(θ)) for all
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θ. Fix an arbitrary θ; put for all t ≥ 0 and all θt
Ct(θt) = Ct+1(θ, θt) and kt+1(θt) = kt+2(θ, θt)
Clearly, (C,K) is feasible at k1(θ)by construction. Also it is incentive compatible
since (C,K) actually is (see condition (2)). Therefore, since θ was arbitrary, we can
conclude that Ψ is self-generating.
Since Ψ is uniformly bounded (see Remark (2) above), we can then conclude that
Ψ(k) = Φ(Ψ, k) for all k ∈ X.
Proof of Lemma 4. Let {uj , kj}∞t=0 be a sequence in graph(Φ(W )). Then, for
all j there exists (cj , k0j , wj) admissible with respect to W at kj where
uj = e(cj , k0j , wj) and wj(θ) ∈ Ψ(k0j(θ)) for all θ
Given that {kj}∞t=0 ⊂ X, it has a convergent subsequence with limit k ∈ X. But
then since {wj , k0j}∞j=0 is a sequence in graph(Ψ), a compact set, it has a convergent
subsequence as well. Also, by the definition of admissibility, {cj} is also in a compact
set having then a convergent subsequence (and the limit satisfies all the conditions
imposed by admissibility). Therefore, for each θ ∈ ΘN , there exists (c(θ), k0(θ), w(θ))
being the limit point to this convergent subsequence. Clearly, given that momentary
utility function are assumed to be continuous and weak inequalities are preserved in
the limit, (c(θ), k0(θ), w(θ))θ∈ΘN is admissible with respect to k. Therefore,
lim
m→∞
(
X
θ∈ΘN
π(θ){θnun(cjmn (θ)) + βnwjmn (θ)})n∈N = (en(c, k0, w))n∈N ∈ Φ(Ψ, k)
which establishes that graph(Φ(W )) is a compact set.
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Proof of Lemma 5 . We already know that graph(Ψ) is a bounded set. We
need to show that it is also closed. Define the correspondence Ψ such that
graph(Ψ) = closure(graph(Ψ))
Clearly, it follows by definition that graph(Ψ) ⊂ graph(Ψ). By the previous re-
mark, graph(Φ(Ψ)) ⊂ graph(Φ(Ψ)). Since Ψ = Φ(Ψ), graph(Φ(Ψ)) = graph(Ψ) and
graph(Ψ) ⊂ graph(Φ(Ψ)).
Since graph(Ψ) is closed by definition, from Lemma 4 we have that graph(Φ(Ψ))is
also closed. Hence, graph(Ψ) = closure(graph(Ψ)) ⊂ closure(graph(Φ(Ψ))) =
graph(Φ(Ψ)) and therefore Ψ(k) ⊂ Φ(Ψ)(k) for all k ∈ X. But then Ψ is self-
generating and from Proposition 1 we know that Ψ(k) ⊂ Ψ(k) for all k ∈ X. This
implies that graph(Ψ) ⊂ graph(Ψ) and thus graph(Ψ) is closed.
Proof of Lemma 6. We complete this proof in two steps.
Step 1. We claim that if graph(W ) is convex, then graph(Φ(W )) is also convex.
Let (u, k), (u, k) ∈ graph(Φ(W )). We need to show that for all α ∈ [0, 1], uα ≡
(αu + (1 − α)u) ∈ Φ(W )(αk + (1 − α)k). We know that there exist (c, k0, w) and
(c, k
0
, w) that are admissible with respect to W at k and k, respectively, such that
for all n
un = en(c, k
0, w) and un = en(c, k
0
, w)
We need to show that there exists (cα, k0α, wα) that is admissible with respect to
W at αk + (1 − α)k ≡ kα such that en(cα, k0α, wα) = uαn for all n. Since un is
continuous for all n, using the Intermediate Value Theorem, define cαn(θ) such that
un(c
α
n(θ)) ≡ αun(cn(θ))+(1−α)un(cn(θ)) for all n and for all θ. Note that since un is
concave, it follows that cαn(θ) ≤ αcn(θ)+ (1−α)cn(θ) for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, define
wαn(θ) ≡ wn(θ) + (1− α)wn(θ) and k0α(θ) ≡ k0(θ) + (1− α)k
0
(θ) for all n and for all
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θ. Note that since it is assumed that graph(W ) is convex, then wαn(θ) ∈ W (k0α(θ))
for all θ. Also, the alternative allocation is clearly feasible and incentive compatible
by construction since f is concave. Thus, (cα, k0α, wα) is admissible with respect to
to W at kα. Since by construction en(cα, k0α, wα) = uαn for all n, we are done.
Step 2. For any set A ⊆ RN , let co(A) be the convex hull of A. Define the corre-
spondence eΨ such that graph(eΨ) = co(graph(eΨ)). Clearly, graph(Ψ) ⊆ graph(eΨ)
and therefore graph(Φ(Ψ)) ⊆ graph(Φ(eΨ)). Since Ψ = Φ(Ψ) by Proposition 3,
graph(Ψ) ⊆ graph(Φ(eΨ)). Since the graph(eΨ) is convex by definition, it follows
by Step 1 that graph(Φ(eΨ)) is also convex. Therefore,
graph(eΨ) = co(graph(eΨ)) ⊆ co(graph(Φ(eΨ))) = graph(Φ(eΨ))
But then eΨ(k) ⊆ Φ(eΨ)(k) for all k ∈ X and therefore eΨ is self-generating. By
Proposition 3, it follows that eΨ(k) ⊆ Ψ(k) for all k ∈ X and then graph(Ψ) ⊇
graph(eΨ). Therefore, we can conclude that Ψ has a convex graph.
Proof of Lemma 7. Consider θn > eθn and note that
X
θ−n
π(θ−n) {θnun(cn(θn, θ−n)) + βnwn(θn, θ−n)}
≥
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)
n
θnun(cn(eθn, θ−n)) + βnwn(eθn, θ−n)o
and
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)
neθnun(cn(eθn, θ−n)) + βnwn(eθn, θ−n)o
≥
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)
neθnun(cn(θn, θ−n)) + βnwn(θn, θ−n)o
imply
(θn − eθn)X
θ−n
π(θ−n)[un(cn(θn, θ−n)− un(cn(eθn, θ−n))] ≥ 0
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Also, from the previous inequalities, it follows that
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)wn(θn, θ−n) ≥
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)wn(eθn, θ−n)
as desired.
Proof of Lemma 8. (i) Suppose first that k > k. Suppose that (c∗, k0∗, w∗)
is eﬃcient at (k, u−1). Consider the following alternative allocation (c, k
0
, w). Let
² = f(k) − f(k) and define k0(θ) = k0∗(θ). Let cn(θ) = c∗n(θ) for all n 6= 1 and for
all θ. Also, put wn(θ) = w∗n(θ) for all θ and for all n. Define ²j ∈ (0, ²] such that
cn(θj , θ−n) = c∗n(θj , θ−n) + ²j for all θ−n. Finally, it is easy to see that {²j}Jj:1 can be
chosen strictly positive such that incentive compatibility is satisfied. For example,
if Θ = {θ, θ} where θ < θ, put ² and ² such that Pθ−1 π(θ−1)[u1(c1(θ, θ−1) + ²) −
u1(c1(θ, θ−1))] =
P
θ−1 π(θ−1)[u1(c1(θ, θ−1)+²)−u1(c1(θ, θ−1)+²)] andmax(², ²) ≤ ².
This alternative allocation is admissible with respect to Ψ at k and V (k, u−1) <
e1(c, k
0
, w) ≤ V (k, u−1).
A similar argument shows that V is strictly decreasing in u−1 but some additional
comments might help to get some of the intuition. Suppose that for some agent n, his
utility is reduced from un to un. Any admissible and promise keeping allocation will
assigns a lower level of consumption either today or in the future (or both). Suppose
that this happens at period t if θt−1 has been reported. This will allow to increase the
level of aggregate capital available at t+ 1 and thus one could increase consumption
for agent 1 whenever θt−1 has been reported and for all θt. Since µ(θt−1) > 0 for all
θt−1, this will increase agent 1’s expected utility.
(ii) Now we will show that V is a continuous function. First, observe that
e1(c, k
0, w) =
P
θ π(θ){u1(c1(θ)) + β1w1(θ)} is a continuous function with respect
to (c, k0, w). Then, since Ψ is a correspondence mapping X into RN with a compact
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and convex graph, it follows that Ψ is a compact-valued and continuous correspon-
dence (Stokey, Lucas and Prescott [24], Theorem 3.4 and 3.5). Let A ≡ {(k, u−1) ∈
X ×RN−1 : u−1 ∈ Ψ−1(k)} and define for each (k, u−1) ∈ A the correspondence
Γ(k, u−1) ≡ {(c, k0, w) : (c, k0, w) is admissible with respect to Ψ at k
and un = en(c, k0, w) for all n 6= 1}
Since Ψ is a continuous correspondence on a compact domain, it is easy to check
that A is a compact set. Also, it is a standard exercise to check that Γ is a continuous,
compact valued correspondence since Ψ is a continuous correspondence on a compact
domain and en(c, k0, w) are continuous functions for all n.16
Therefore, it follows from the Theorem of the Maximum that V is a continuous
function on A.
Proof of Proposition 9. Assume, on the contrary, that (c, k0, w) is eﬃcient
at (k, u−1), where un = en(c, k
0
, w). Without loss of generality, suppose that n 6= 1
and this imply that V (k, u−1) > 0 (as it will be clear, the whole proof goes through
when n = 1).17 Assume to simplify that Θ = {θ, θ} where θ < θ. First, we claim that
if agent n is entitled to some positive expected utility level, then cn(θ, θ−n) > 0 for
all θ−n. Let λnθi,θj be the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to ICC corresponding
to agent n giving incentives to reveal the observed preference shock θi instead of θj .
Similarly, let γ(θn, θ−n) and ηn be the agent n0s Lagrange multipliers corresponding
to the feasibility constraint and to the promise keeping constraint, respectively, when
the aggregate state is (θn, θ−n) ( η1 = 1). Consider now the necessary FOC with
respect to cn(θ, θ−n) :
π−n(θ−n)u0n(cn(θ, θ−n))[ηnπn(θ)θ + λnθ,θθ − λ
n
θ,θθ] ≤ γ(θ, θ−n)
16See Stokey, Lucas and Prescott [24], Exercises 3.12 and 3.13.
17 If V (k, u−1) = 0, then it follows that c1(θ) = w1(θ) = 0 for all θ.
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with equality if cn(θ, θ−n) > 0. Now, if cn(θ, θ−n) = 0, then it follows that λnθ,θθ −
λnθ,θθ < 0 (ηn > 0 if agent n is entitled with a positive utility level). Now consider
the necessary FOC with respect to cn(θ, θ−n), which can be written:
π−n(θ−n)u0n(cn(θ, θ−n))[ηnπn(θ)θ + λnθ,θθ − λ
n
θ,θθ] ≤ γ(θ, θ−n)
If λnθ,θθ−λ
n
θ,θθ < 0, then it follows that cn(θ, θ−n) > 0 for all θ−n. But this contradicts
Lemma 7.
Since cn(θ, θ−n) > 0 for all θ−n, observe that if
P
θ−n π(θ−n)u(cn(θn, θ−n)) = un
for all θn ∈ Θ, it follows that un > 0. Therefore, it must be that, for some eθ−n,
cn(θ,eθ−n) > 0. Observe also that π(θ,eθ−n) > 0.
Let eθ = (θ,eθ−n) and define an alternative recursive allocation as follows:
ecn(eθ) = cn(eθ)− λ, ewn(eθ) = wn(eθ) + δn, ek0(eθ) = k0(eθ) + λ
For all θ 6= eθ, put ecn(θ) = cn(θ), ewn(θ) = wn(θ) and ek0(θ) = k0(θ). For all i 6= n, put
simply eci(θ) = ci(θ) and ewi(θ) = wi(θ) for all θ. We will restrict (λ, δn) À 0 such
that (ec,ek0, ew) is admissible with respect to Ψ at k and en(ec,ek0, ew) > en(c, k0, w).
Step 1. Note that by continuity of V , (λ, δn) can be chosen such that
w1(eθ) ≤ V (k0(eθ) + λ, (wn(eθ) + δn, {wi(eθ)}i 6=1,n)) (8)
since V is decreasing in w−1 and increasing in k0. Therefore, we can find (λ, δn)À 0
such that ( ew1(eθ), ewn(eθ), { ewi(eθ)}i∈I/{1,n}) ∈ Ψ(ek0(bθ)).
Step 2. If λ > 0 and cn(eθ)− λ ≥ 0, then feasibility is satisfied by definition.
Step 3. Incentive Compatibility. Since the recursive allocation (c, k
0
, w) is assumed
to be admissible with respect to Ψ at k, there is nothing to check for agent i 6= n.
Consider agent n and for cn(eθ)− λ ≥ 0 define
gn(θ,λ) = θ[un(cn(eθ))− un(cn(eθ)− λ)]
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Note that gn(θ, 0) = 0 and it is strictly increasing in λ for λ > 0. Also if λ > 0,
then gn(θ,λ) < gn(θ,λ). Hence, since (c, k
0
, w) is incentive compatible, it is easy to
check that
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)[θun(ecn(θ, θ−n)) + βn ewn(θ, θ−n)]
≥
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)[θun(ec1(θ, θ−n)) + βn ewn(θ, θ−n)]
is satisfied if
gn(θ,λ) ≤ βnδn (9)
Similarly,
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)[θun(ecn(θ, θ−n)) + βn ewn(θ, θ−n)]
≥
X
θ−n
π(θ−n)[θun(ecn(θ, θ−n)) + βn ewn(θ, θ−n)]
is satisfied if
gn(θ,λ) ≥ βnδn (10)
Put gn(θ,λ) = βnδn > gn(θ,λ) and then conditions (8), (9) and (10) are satisfied for
some (λ, δn) À 0. For instance, put λ = 1/k and define δkn by letting gn(θ, 1/k) =
βnδkn > 0. Note that (1/k,δkn)& (0, 0) as k →∞ and then condition (8) is satisfied
by continuity.
Step 4. Finally, note that for all i 6= n, ei(ec,ek0, ew) = ei(c, k0, w) by construction.
Also, observe that
en(ec,ek0, ew) = X
θ
π(θ){un(ecn(θ)) + βn ewn(θ)}
= en(c, k
0
, w) + π(bθ)[βnδn − gn(θ,λ)] = eun
> en(c, k
0
, w) = un
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Hence, (ec,ek0, ew) is a recursive allocation which admissible with respect to Ψ(k) such
that
e1(ec,ek0, ew) = V (k, u−1), en(ec,ek0, ew) = eun > un, ei(ec,ek0, ew) = ui for all i ∈ I/{1, n}
Let eu−1 = (eun, {un}i∈I/{1,n}). Since V (k, u−1) > V (k, eu−1) ≥ e1(ec,ek0, ew) by
Lemma 8, we get the desired contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 10. Given any (k, u−1), let (c∗, k
0∗, w∗)(k, u−1) be the
eﬃcient recursive allocation. Suppose that there exists some eθ such that
0 ≤ w∗1(eθ) < V (k0∗(eθ), w∗−1(eθ))
Since V (0, w∗−1) = 0 for any w
∗
−1, this implies that k
0∗(eθ) > 0. Since V is contin-
uous, there exists 0 ≤ k0(eθ) < k0∗(eθ) such that V (k0(eθ), w∗−1(eθ)) = 0. Finally, since V
is continuous and strictly decreasing in k, it follows by the mean value theorem that
there exists some k
0
(eθ) ≤ k0∗∗(eθ) < k0∗(eθ) such that w∗1(eθ) = V (k0∗∗(eθ), w∗−1(eθ)). The
alternative recursive allocation (c∗, k
0∗∗, w∗) is incentive compatible, promise keep-
ing and feasible by construction since a free disposal technology is available. It is
immediate that in fact (c∗, k
0∗∗, w∗) is also eﬃcient at (k, u−1).
Proof of Proposition 11. Denote ∆(k,Un) = {{θt}∞t=0 : limt→∞Kt+1(θ
t) = k > 0
and lim
t→∞
Unt(θt) = Un ∈ Ψn(k) for some n}. Given (k0, U0), take any {θt}∞t=0 ∈
∆(k,Un) and consider the path of the following stochastic vector
{Kt, Ut, c∗(θ)(Kt, Ut), k0∗(θ)(Kt, Ut), w∗(θ)(Kt, Ut)}∞t=0
where w∗(θ)(Kt, Ut) ∈ Ψ(k0∗(θ)(Kt, Ut)) for all t and all θ ∈ ΘN . Also, for all t
Unt =
X
θ∈ΘN
π(θ){θnun(c∗n(θ)(Kt, Ut)) + βnw∗n(θ)(Kt, Ut)}
U1t = V
∗
1 (Kt, U−1t)
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Note that this is a sequence in a compact set and therefore it will have a convergent
subsequence. Without loss of generality, assume that the relevant subsequence is the
sequence itself. Denote the corresponding limit point by {bk, bU,bc,bk0, bw}. Note that
bk = k and bUn = Un.
Step 1. We claim that (bc,bk0, bw) is admissible with respect to Ψ at bk. Moreover,
it is eﬃcient at (bk, bU−1).
To see this, note first that by definition (w∗(θ)(Kt, Ut), k0∗(θ)(Kt, Ut)) ∈ graph(Ψ)
for all t and all θ ∈ ΘN . Since Ψ has a compact graph, it follows that for all θ ∈ ΘN
( bw(θ),bk0(θ)) ∈ graph(Ψ) and then bw(θ) ∈ Ψ(bk0(θ)) for all θ ∈ ΘN .
Since weak inequalities are preserved in the limit and by continuity of f , it is also
true that for all θ ∈ ΘN
X
n∈I
bcn(θ) + bk0(θ) ≤ f(bk) and bcn(θ) ≥ 0
By continuity of un, it follows for all n ∈ I that
lim
t→∞
Unt = lim
t→∞
X
θ∈ΘN
π(θ){θnun(c∗n(θ)(Kt, Ut)) + βnw∗n(θ)(Kt, Ut)}
bUn = X
θ∈ΘN
π(θ){θnun(bcn(θ)) + βn bwn(θ)}
Finally, note that since V is continuous it follows that
lim
t→∞
U1t = lim
t→∞
V (Kt, U−1t) = V (bk, bU−1)
That is, (bc,bk0, bw) is an eﬃcient recursive allocation at (bk, bU−1).
Step 2. Since in this case the economy does not collapse in the limit by assump-
tion, consider any agent h such that bUh > 0. We claim that there exists eθ−h such
that either
(a) lim
t→∞
w∗h(θ,eθ−h)(Kt, Ut) 6= bUh
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or
(b) lim
t→∞
w∗h(θ,eθ−h)(Kt, Ut) 6= bUh
To see this, assume that it is not true. Then, it follows from Lemma 7 that for all θh
bUh = lim
t→∞
X
θ−h
π(θ−h)w∗h(θ, θ−h)(Kt, Ut) ≥ limt→∞
X
θ−h
π(θ−h)w∗h(θh, θ−h)(Kt, Ut)
≥ lim
X
θ−h
π(θ−h)w∗h(θ,bθ−h)(Kt, Ut) = bUh
Now observe that for all θh > eθh, incentive compatibility and Lemma 7 imply that
βh
X
θ−h
π(θ−h)[w∗h(θh, θ−h)(Kt, Ut)− w∗h(eθh, θ−h)(Kt, Ut)]
≥ θh
X
θ−h
π(θ−h)[uh(c∗h(eθh, θ−h)(Kt, Ut))− uh(c∗h(θh, θ−h)(Kt, Ut))
≥ eθhX
θ−h
π(θ−h)[uh(c∗h(eθh, θ−h)(Kt, Ut))− uh(c∗h(θh, θ−h)(Kt, Ut))
≥ βh
X
θ−h
π(θ−h)[w∗h(θh, θ−h)(Kt, Ut)− w∗h(eθh, θ−h)(Kt, Ut)]
Taking limits it follows that for all (θh,eθh)
lim
t→∞
X
θ−h
π(θ−h)[uh(c∗h(θh, θ−h)(Kt, Ut))− uh(c∗h(eθh, θ−h)(Kt, Ut))] = 0
Since uh is assumed continuous and (kt, c∗h(θ)(Kt,Wt)) → (bk,bch(θ)) for all θ, it fol-
lows that
P
θ−h π(θ−h)uh(bch(θh, θ−h)) = uh for all θh. But this is a contradiction to
Proposition 9 since bUh > 0.
Step 3. Suppose that (a) holds and consider the sequence of q0s such that
Untq+1 = w
∗
n(θ,eθ−n)(Ktq , Utq)
Since (a) holds, this equality can hold only for a finite number of q0s. Therefore,
∆(k, Un) ⊂ {{θt}∞t=0} ∈ Ω : θt = (θ,eθ−n) finitely often}
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must hold.18 But since all partial histories have strictly positive probabilities, this
last set has probability zero (it is the countable union of zero probability sets). That
is, µ{{θt}∞t=0} ∈ Ω : θt = (θ,eθ−n) finitely often} = 0.
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